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I. Introduction
I
n recent years, attempted Chinese land deals in different South American
countries have drawn much public attention, and varying domestic reper-
cussions. This study examines domestic reactions to planned Chinese land
acquisitions within the soy sector in Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia. With focus
on attempted large-scale Chinese deals in West Bahia in Brazil, Rio Negro in
Argentina, and Santa Cruz in Bolivia, the article analyses the processes
whereby different domestic actors in these countries responded to such agree-
ments. With point of departure in literature on land investments and in writings
on contentious politics, the study scrutinizes how the prospects of Chinese land
deals mobilize different domestic stakeholders, which through negative public
framing of the issue generate pressures for more restrictive regulation. This
general process largely applies to the Brazilian and Argentinean cases, while
there is an apparent absence of major protest in Bolivia. A most similar case de-
sign (George & Bennett 2005) is applied to account for the significant opposi-
tion to Chinese land purchases in Brazil and Argentina, considering the
backdrop of the absence of protest in Bolivia. The diverging domestic reactions
to these deals are explained through analysis of the rural socioeconomic struc-
ture and mode of production, as well as the differences in the international eco-
nomic insertion of each of these countries. In the following sections this article
proceeds with; 2) a review on the literature on land grabs and contentious poli-
tics within the field of agriculture, 3) a section presenting the article’s method-
ological considerations and case selection procedure, 4) an analysis of each of
the three country cases selected, and 5) the conclusions and final discussion.
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II. Perspectives on land grabbing and resistance
Different inquiries within the field of contentious politics have led to contri-
butions that emphasize the connectedness between the particular spatial and
temporal locus of land conflicts, and their embeddedness within broader histori-
cal and geographical social processes. Contextual factors may thus define the
latent potential for land conflicts, while localized conditions trigger such
events. Land change contestations may thus materialize as intersections of so-
cial dynamics rooted at the regional, national, and transnational level (Aldrich
et al., 2012), while simultaneously being transgressive of such compartmenta-
lizations. While the politics around land grabbing involve a variety of actors on
different social levels, a body of scholarly work tends to emphasize contes-
tations ‘from below’, and not least how the complex array of socioeconomic
drivers of land conflict can lead to diverse social responses, and very heteroge-
neous counter-reactions (Hall et al., 2015). This highlights the need to examine
the political spaces where expressions of contestation are made, with a particu-
lar eye to the channels of admittance to such spheres, which defines the degree
of access which different societal actors enjoy (Wells-Dang 2010, p.94). These
considerations lead to the formulation of research question 1:
• How have Chinese land deals intersected with the existing socio-
economic land tenure structure and latent conflict potential?
Understanding the domestic repercussions of Chinese attempts at large-
scale land acquisitions in South America warrants identification of the central
stakeholders in this process, and how these are positioned within a terrain of
contestation vis-à-via propagation of this development. Rocheleau (2015) illus-
trates how both proponents and opposition to land deals can assume a net-
worked structure, through coalitions spanning across different societal spheres.
The potentially wide-ranging socio-environmental implications of land invest-
ments may thus spur the joint organization of actors with otherwise diverging
motivations (Temper 2018, p.209). Opposition can thereby be highly heteroge-
neous, and even include domestic agribusiness interests (Mamonova 2015).
Another group of studies tends to highlight the particular modes of resis-
tance adopted by actors contrary to land deals. These contributions emphasize
how opposition has gained diverse expressions, spanning from peaceful mani-
festations of discontent to direct violent conflict (Anseeuw & Taylor 2014), and
official channels of protest, to more unorganized and indirect means of rejection
(Moreda 2015). Disparate power relations between the state, agro-capital, and
rural population do not necessarily compress the scope for contestation, but
rather lead to distinct modes of opposition (Schneider 2011). Kerkvliet (2009)
thus makes a three-pronged conceptualization of peasant political expression,
comprising of 1) official politics, engaging with established authorities and or-
ganizations, 2) advocacy politics, referring to organized opposition in relation
to authorities, and 3) everyday politics, involving relatively unorganized ex-
pressions of protest through quotidian and often subtle acts of resistance
(Kerkvliet 2009, p.231-232). Research question 2 has thus been formulated as
the following:
• Which domestic constellations of opposition have the Chinese
land deals engendered, and what means of protest have been ap-
plied?
Accounts of foreign land grabbing constitute a potentially very powerful
storyline of dispossession. Land disputes are often marked by conflicting narra-
tives, which, depending on their successful proliferation, define the practical vi-
ability of advancing such projects (Smalley & Corbera 2012).The process of
framing land deals can thereby both define the extent of public awareness/alarm
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(Borras & Franco 2010, p.7), and may also place this phenomenon as the central
object of the coalescence of social and environmental preoccupations (Temper
2018, p.200). Yet, other contributions have also highlighted how narrative ac-
counts of land investments often also become open for selective and opportunis-
tic appropriation by elites (Baird 2014; Scoones et al., 2013, p.476). Research
question 3 has thus aims to explore which dominant representations of the at-
tempted Chinese land deals have become evident within the public debates:
• Which public framings have prevailed in the reactions to Chinese
land deals, and how have different social groups engaged in their
construction?
Acts of resistance to the global land rush may spill over into changes within
institutions for land governance. Cotula (2013) applies the Polaniyan notion of
a double movement to conceptualize incipient signs of re-imposition of social
concerns within otherwise strongly market-oriented regulatory frameworks in
trends within international investment law. A similar movement on the domes-
tic level, from popular opposition, which eventually results in regulatory re-
strictions towards foreign land investments, has also been detected by McAl-
lister (2015, p.823). The state’s structurating agency hereby becomes central in
mediating often contrary social pressures for regulatory changes regarding
large-scale land deals (Oliveira 2016). Research question 4 thus seeks to assess
the potential legislative responses to the attempted Chinese land deals:
• To which extent have reactions to Chinese land deals spurred reg-
ulatory action within the national institutional framework for land
governance?
The reviewed literature thereby suggests that the process of domestic con-
testation of Chinese land deals may be ordered in a causal sequence, in which 1)
the rural socioeconomic context defines the latent potential for 2) organized op-
position to Chinese land grabs, producing 3) negative public framing of these
deals, and eventually results in 4) restrictive legislation to foreign land acquisi-
tions. This would lead to the assumption that the multifaceted socioeconomic
and environmental implications related to foreign land investment wield the po-
tential to spur cross-sectorial mobilizations in heterogeneous constellations of
social, corporate, and public actors. The manner in which such actors subse-
quently contribute to the public framing of this issue is thereby viewed within
the present analysis as the product of intentional action, with the goal of obtain-
ing a specific legislative result.
III. An approach to contemporary land deals
Since the global food crisis of 2007-2008, demand for farmland has under-
gone dramatic periodic accelerations beyond anything previously witnessed.
While for comparison, the total area of global farmland expanded less than 4
million hectares annually before 2008, land deals involving 56 million hectares
were proclaimed in 2009 (World Bank 2011). These large-scale farmland ac-
quisitions by states and private investors first became known as a ‘’land grabs’’
in 2008 (GRAIN 2008), - a term widely used since then. Not least the appropria-
tions of large tracts of land in developing countries by developed states, from
2006 and onwards, spurred much international attention and preoccupation
(Food scarce sparks Third World land rush 2009).
Although much scholarly work has examined global land deals in the after-
math of the food crisis, empirical assessments of the extent of this phenomenon
have been relatively difficult (White et al., 2012, p.620). Focus has gradually
moved from initial quantitative estimates of land deals as measured in hectares,
towards conceptualizations of the modalities and diverse expressions of this de-
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velopment (Sauer & Borras 2016). Debate about how to outline contemporary
land investments have therefore revolved around specific definitions, measure-
ment, their drivers and central actors, and consequent political reactions (Edel-
man, Oya & Borras 2013, p.1518). With the potential shortcomings associated
with purely quantitative analyses of land grabbing in mind (Scoones et al.,
2013; Edelman 2013), the data initially presented is meant to provide an ‘indic-
ative’ overview (Edelman 2013, p.497) of the phenomenon of Chinese land
investments in Latin America, upon which a more qualitative analysis is under-
taken. Numbers from GRAIN are included in the study, as this database, along
with Land Matrix, constitute some of the most widely applied informational
sources available. For the present purpose, GRAIN holds an advantage of pro-
viding a static “snapshot” of deals concluded by 2016, in contrast to the more
dynamic database of Land Matrix. The GRAIN database registers foreign in-
vestments in farmland that have been concluded since 2006, and which com-
prise of areas above 500 hectares (GRAIN 2016).
The bulk of the analysis employs qualitative evidence from different sour-
ces. Whenever possible, a critical review of existing literature undertaking an in
depth analysis of the political processes examined has been conducted. Yet, due
to a relative scarcity of information on certain aspects of the cases examined,
news reports and email questionnaires have also been made use of. The ques-
tionnaires have been sent to specialists in land tenure issues and/or NGO repre-
sentatives working within the field in the countries analyzed. They have been
structured according to an open-ended format, allowing each respondent to
elaborate on the issues of interest in her/his own words. Legal provisions have
also been scrutinized and their implications synthesized in certain parts of the
article.
The global land rush has been strongly felt in Latin America, where large-
scale land deals have spiked in the wake of the food crisis (Flexor & Leite 2017,
p.394; Sauer 2010, p.78; Brent et al., 2017). Estimates conducted by the World
Bank indicate that Latin America, together with Sub-Saharan Africa, will ac-
count for two-thirds of new agricultural land brought into production towards
2030 (World Bank 2011, p.xxviii). Land investments in Latin America has
prompted discussions of national sovereignty, as its contemporary financialized
character constitutes a more intensified version of historical processes of for-
eign land acquisitions, which today are expressed by surging land prices and ru-
ral conflict (Castro & Igreja 2017, p.175).
Interest in Latin American agriculture on behalf of both public and private
Chinese actors has also become evident in recent years. Apart from land acqui-
sition, attention has also been focused on participation in the regional agro-in-
dustrial complex, which hitherto has been dominated by Western multinationals
(Myers 2013). Chinese attempts to purchase or lease large tracts of farmland in
Latin America have often been met by negative public reactions, in spite of their
relatively limited extension (Myers 2013; Myers & Jie 2015). As is illustrated in
Table 1, confirmed land deals with Chinese investors in Bolivia, Brazil, and Ar-
gentina nonetheless constitute a relatively modest share of total foreign land
grabs in these countries.
Although larger land deals, comparable to those of Western investors, have
been attempted, they have largely been unsuccessful, particularly in Brazil and
Argentina. As is illustrated in Table 2, different Chinese mega-deals proposed
in Brazil and Argentina have not materialized, while the single major deal
which was planned in Bolivia, has been confirmed.
The Bolivian deal refers to the sale of 12.488 hectares for soybean, sor-
ghum, and maize cultivation in the province of Santa Cruz, to the Shanghai
Pengxin Group in 2005. While significant deals implying the Chinese acquisi-
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tions of 145.000 and 68.600 hectares in Brazil, and 22.000 in Argentina have
been concluded, the stalled attempts at obtaining 200.000 hectares in Brazil, and
320.000 hectares in Argentina nonetheless draw attention. The obstacles which
Chinese land acquisitions have faced in Brazil and Argentina, compared to
Bolivia, therefore make it relevant to examine how reactions to these attempted
purchases unfolded within each country, and which factors might explain this
variation.
As Chinese land purchases faced strong domestic opposition and significant
regulatory changes in Brazil and Argentina, while no significant protest materi-
alized in Bolivia, these differences are approached through a most similar case
design (George & Bennett 2005). This case design aims at identifying crucial
differences in cases which otherwise share many similarities, by assessing the
importance of essential variables which may account for the difference in out-
comes. For the present purpose, this implies that because the chosen cases share
many similarities in factors that potentially might define reactions to Chinese
land deals, explanations for their different outcomes are sought in a more re-
stricted spectrum of socio-economic circumstances on which they vary. Brazil,
Argentina, and Bolivia are all marked by extensive land investments in recent
years. Apart from Venezuela, Suriname and Jamaica, these are also the only
states in Latin America and the Caribbean where the American Enterprise Insti-
tute identifies Chinese agricultural investments (AEI 2018). All three countries
have been marked by a stable relationship to China, and rapidly increasing FDI
inflows and increasing commercial interconnectedness with, this Asian country
throughout the 2000s, thus constituting a central commonality across the cases.
Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia are also all characterized by a very extensive
scale of agricultural cultivation practices which has permitted intensive produc-
tion of grains and oilseeds in the Pampa, Chaco, and Cerrado regions. Cases of
land purchases for soy production are chosen, as this mode of agro-industrial
development often engenders particular socio-environmental pressures, and
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Table 1 - Proportion of Chinese land acquisitions in Bolivia, Brazil and Argentina from 2005-2016
Country Confirmed Chinese land
deals in hectares
Total area of confirmed foreign
land deals in hectares
Chinese land deals as percent-
age of total foreign land deals
Bolivia 12.488 67.845 18.4%
Brazil 213.600 2.721.102 7.8%
Argentina 22.000 513.116 4.2%
Source: calculations based on GRAIN 2016.
Table 2 - List of concluded and unconcluded Chinese land deals in Bolivia, Brazil, and Argentina from 2005-2016
Country Purchaser Area in hectares Status of Agreement
Argentina Beidahuang 320.000 Failed
Argentina China Grains and Oils Group Corporation 22.000 Concluded
Bolivia Pengxin Group 12.488 Concluded
Brazil Universo Verde Agronegócios Ltd (Chongqing) 68.600 Concluded
Brazil COFCO Agri Ltd 145.000 Concluded
Brazil Chongqing 200.000 Failed I
Source: GRAIN 2016.
I While the 200.000 ha. deal by Chongquing in Bahia did not materialize, the company did manage to aquire some of the areas of
interest to it. The succesfull 68.8000 ha. deal made by this company through its subsidiary, Universo Verde Agronegócios, and
the stalled 200.000 ha. deal are therefore not completely seperable, but have here been distinguished for the purpose of clarity.
consequent opposition. Finally, notwithstanding democratic challenges in all of
these countries, they are still characterized by an institutional environment
which in the period examined has been largely permissive of organized protest,
thus differing from the case of Venezuela1.
IV. An analysis of each of the three country cases selected
The abovementioned circumstances make it possible to hold certain funda-
mental contextual factors constant across all cases, while focusing on variation
in the rural socioeconomic landscape and the structure of domestic agribusiness
capital in order to explain differences in the repercussions which Chinese in-
vestments have had within each particular case. In order to assess the causal sig-
nificance of the potentially crucial factors in each case examined, evidence has
been sought from different informational sources, such as existing studies
within the field, news articles, key interviewees, and statistical databases. Inter-
viewees from either civil society organizations or academic experts within the
field were selected and contacted by email on basis of their specific knowledge
in relation to the cases analyzed.
IV.1 The West Bahia land deal and Brazilian reactions
By the early 20th century, foreign land holdings in Brazil were relatively
limited. This gradually changed from the middle of the century, and with the in-
wards agricultural expansion from the 1970-1980s, foreign rural establishments
increased markedly (Sauer & Leite 2012, p.513). In 1971, foreign land pur-
chases were regulated through law no.5.709, but its statutes were vague, and be-
came subjected to many posterior alterations (BRAZIL Lei 5.709, 1971). Due
to the intention of attracting foreign capital, the law was never implemented vig-
orously (Sauer & Leite 2012, p.507). A constitutional amendment from 1995
eliminated the juridical distinction between national and foreign capital, which
effectively exempted foreign land buyers from obtaining a special authorization
(Nakatani et al., 2014, p.70). As the land rush intensified throughout the 1990s,
land tenure conflict became widespread, affecting millions of peasants and re-
sulting in violent clashes and fatalities throughout the country (Simmons 2005,
p.308). Large-scale land deals involving both foreign and domestic agro-indus-
trial conglomerates nonetheless accelerated from around 2008 (Pitta, Boechat
& Mendoça 2017; Sauer 2010, p.72-73).
In 2008, the Chinese Chongqing Grain Group signaled its intent to purchase
200.000 hectares of land for soy production in the Western region of the state of
Bahia. This announcement drew much public attention, and preoccupations
also rose within large parts of Brazilian agribusiness. In May 2010, the Presi-
dent of the Brazilian Association of Soy Producers (APROSOJA), Glauber
Silveira, expressed concerns about the estimated 1 million hectares of land pos-
sessed by foreign individuals and capital funds. Silveira referred to Chinese in-
vestments as a threat to Brazilian producers, and highlighted the importance of
maintaining national control of agricultural production (Um milhão de hectares
já são de estrangeiros 2010). Resentment towards Chinese investment amongst
both industrialists and the landed elite materialized in a joint campaign, high-
lighting their supposedly politically driven nature, and defending a tightening
of regulation. These mobilizations’ central figureheads were the Depute Ho-
mero Pereira, from the de-facto right-wing Partido da República, and former
Minister of Finance, Delfim Neto. (Oliveira 2018, p.124).
The campaign against Chinese land purchases resonated strongly within
Brazilian media outlets and produced a negative framing as part of the strategy
to garner political support for regulatory action. In 2010, the newspaper Folha
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1 According to GRAIN (2016)
Latin American countries
where large-scale Chinese
land deals or attempted land
deals have materialized are
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Jamaica and Venezuela.
de São Paulo described how foreign land purchases amounted to the equivalent
territory to 22 football fields every hour, and referred to this development as a
“foreign invasion” (Estrangeiros compram 22 campos de futebol por hora
2010). In an editorial text, the conservative newspaper Estadão expressed alarm
about Chinese land purchases, which were associated with neo-colonialism,
and cited Delfim Neto who stated that “after buying Africa, the Chinese are now
attempting to buy Brazil” (China compra terras no Brasil 2010). The editorial
piece highlighted the Chongqing Grain Group’s attempted deal in West Bahia,
and described it as part of a wider Chinese power-seeking strategy (Ibid). The
campaign bought into broader narratives of Chinese global land grabbing, but
also converged with dominant storylines within other business sectors about
this Asian economy’s negative economic impact on Brazil, giving voice to what
has been referred to as a “anti-Chinese protectionism” (Powell 2012, p.201).
Increasing inflows of foreign capital into Brazilian agriculture had resulted
in rising land prices, which frustrated many medium-sized producers who were
too small to benefit from these investments through partnerships (Oliveira
2017, p.152-153). The president of the Brazilian Vegetable Oil Industry Asso-
ciation (ABIOVE) also expressed clear concerns regarding the Chinese inves-
tors, affirming that “they are looking for land, looking for reliable partners. But
what they would like to do is run the show alone” (Chinas interest in Farmland
makes Brazil Uneasy 2011). The fact that attempted Chinese land purchases
gained so much negative attention compared other foreign land deals has also
been attributed to circumstances such as local politics in Bahia, a negative bias
within the press,2 and possibly also a degree of “sinophobia” (Oliveira 2018).
An interviewee thus characterizes this as a “loose critique” based on “news sto-
ries” rather than “factual reporting”.3
The campaign against foreign land deals also included smallholder organi-
zations and NGOs. In 2010, social movements organized a campaign to estab-
lish a general ceiling for rural property, with a strong emphasis on halting
large-scale foreign land purchases (Sauer & Leite 2012, p.520). William Cle-
mentino from the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG)
thus argued that the “foreignization” of land did not constitute a viable develop-
ment path, as it raised prices on rural property, and thereby obstructed land
reform (Câmara dos Deputados 2011a). On the discursive level, these mobiliza-
tions pitted the notion of development through agro-industrial expansion
against the principles of food security, sovereignty, and land reform (Castro,
Hershaw & Sauer 2017, p.92). Carlos Vicente, from the Spanish NGO, GRAIN,
emphasized the negative implications of foreign land deals in Brazil in terms of
perpetuating monoculture and augmenting vulnerability to speculative invest-
ment (Câmara dos Deputados 2011a). Prior to these mobilizations, left-leaning
political factions and social movements supporting the incumbent Workers
Party had similarly backed restrictions of foreign land purchases (Oliveira
2017, p.152). Coupled with dissatisfaction on behalf of smallholder segments
with the Lula government’s alleged lack of attention to land reform, and with
the accelerating process of land concentration, such demands resonated stron-
gly.4 Restrictive regulation on foreign land deals could thereby marry a reaffir-
mation of the government’s support base with a strengthening of ties with
groups within the highly politically organized agribusiness sector.
The negative public attention towards foreign land purchases eventually
spurred the Lula administration to respond through restrictions in form of exec-
utive measures (Sauer 2010, p.73). The National Institute for Colonization and
Agrarian Reform (INCRA), which is directly subjected to the presidency, there-
fore requested that the Attorney General of the Union (AGU) revised the legal
decision GQ no.181 of 1998, which in effect averted control with land acquisi-
tion by foreign enterprises in Brazil (Sauer 2010, p.83). Furthermore, in 2010
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2 Interview with Brazilian
specialist in land tenure issues
conducted by email, 15/4,
2018.
3 Interview with Brazilian
specialist in land tenure issues
conducted by email, 15/4,
2018.
4 Interview with Brazilian
specialist in land tenure issues
conducted by email, 15/4,
2018.
joint pressures by members of the presidential cabinet and Federal Public Min-
istry spurred the Attorney General to reinterpret the law no. 5.709 of 1971 on
foreign land holdings towards a more restrictive understanding. The new ver-
sion imposed stronger limits on land acquisitions by foreign individuals and en-
terprises, and for Brazilian companies with more than 50% foreign capital,
while requiring stricter registration of completed land acquisitions. It also pro-
hibited foreign land acquisitions above 50 MEIs - a measure varying from
5-100 hectares depending on the municipality - and foreign possession of more
than 25% of the territory of any single municipality (Câmara dos Deputados
2011b). Although the Attorney General, Luís Inácio Adams, stated that the de-
cision was not directly aimed at limiting Chinese land purchases, he did take no-
tice of Chinese land grabs in Latin America and Africa, underscoring that
“nothing is preventing investment from happening, but it will be regulated”
(Chinas interest in Farmland makes Brazil Uneasy 2011). This converges with
dominant scholarly interpretations of the decision as a direct attempt to limit
Chinese land acquisitions, (Pereira & de Castro Neves 2011, p.6; Myers & Jie
2015, p.16-17; Wilkinson & Wesz 2013, p.255; Oliveira 2018; Powell 2012,
p.206).
In spite of resistance from subsectors within Brazilian agriculture, the Chi-
nese land investments were nonetheless defended by large swaths of Brazilian
agribusiness. Moreira Mendes, leader of the agribusiness caucus in Congress,
thus emphasized that restrictions on foreigners’ land purchases would discour-
age investment, and that mechanisms to ensure sovereignty already were em-
bedded within the Brazilian Constitution (Câmara dos Deputados 2011b).
Similarly, Kátia Abreu, head of the National Confederation of Agriculture
(CNA), defended international land investment as an important means to attract
capital to sectors such as pulp, ethanol, and orange production, and claimed that
resistance to foreign economic participation was due to “harmful entrenched
preconceptions” in Latin America (Câmara dos Deputados 2011a). The CNA
thereby continued to work in close conjunction with Chinese authorities and
private sector representatives in order to attract them to invest in Brazilian agri-
culture, and in 2012 the entity organized public events with this purpose in mind
(CNA quer investimentos chineses no agronegócio brasileiro 2012; Plano de
Voo” 2012).
The reinterpretation of the law 5.709 meant that in spite of not being outright
cancelled, the West Bahia land deal was stalled (Myers & Jie 2015, p.11). Yet,
due to the support for foreign land investment from the agribusiness caucus
within Congress, the executive’s steps towards tightening regulation were not
followed up by legislative action (Las barreras a la extranjerización 2013). The
measures to limit foreign land deals thereby became somewhat isolated and left
some significant room for circumvention. Apart from the flexible definition of
the permitted maximum for foreign land holdings, the INCRA did not dispose
of effective fiscal mechanisms to monitor such deals (Sauer & Leite 2012,
p.521). Furthermore, President Dilma Rousseff, who assumed office in 2011,
along with her Minister of Agriculture, Wagner Rossi, were also more inclined
towards easing restrictions on international agricultural investments. Reports of
foregone foreign investments of up to US$15 billion therefore made Rossi raise
the possibility of leasing land to potential global investors (Brazil mulls leasing
farmland to foreigners 2011).
Rather than completely hampering Chinese interest in Brazilian agriculture,
the legal restrictions appear to have reshaped Chinese commodity enterprises’
strategies towards acquiring agricultural produce through predefined contracts
with producers, and shifted attention towards the processing and logistics
sub-sectors within the agro-industrial complex (Wilkinson & Wesz 2013,
p.255; Oliveira 2018, p.125). By 2013, reports by the Brazilian Intelligence
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Agency (ABIN) suggested that Chinese and Middle Eastern enterprises contin-
ued to acquire Brazilian farmland, through the use of strawmen (Estrangeiros já
têm US$ 60 bilhões em terra no Brasil 2013). This situation would latter spark
attempts towards legislative changes in the direction of liberalization of land
sales by the Temer Administration and the rural caucus in parliament, in early
2017. Thus, although fear of Chinese land grabbing did provide a certain mo-
mentum for regulatory measures to halt this development around 2010, since
then, forces from within the agribusiness sector appear to have been keen on re-
versing these provisions.
IV.2 Mobilizations against the Rio Negro deal in Argentina
Although foreign land holdings have long been part of the Argentinean rural
economic structure, an accelerated process of land investments began with the
crisis of 2001-2002. The devaluation of the Argentinian peso from 2002 be-
came a key factor in attracting foreign capital, which resulted in a large increase
in the number and in the size of land transactions (Costantino 2016, p.139). This
spelled the beginning of a period in which many international investors, includ-
ing state-owned and semi-state enterprises from emerging nations, gained pres-
ence within the Argentinean agricultural sector (Andrieu & Costantino 2017,
p.90). The “foreignization”5 of lands became associated with rural conflicts, as
agro-industrial development reached areas otherwise essential for the social re-
production of local communities (Ibid). This contention was further fueled by
general popular dissatisfaction with the political system in the wake of the cri-
sis, which resulted in a rejection of the neoliberal development trajectory of the
1990s.
Many transactions became centered on the province of Patagonia, which
apart from low land prices also was seen as a relatively safe investment destina-
tion due to scarce population and resultantly perceived lower potential for con-
flict (Vazquez & Sili 2017, p.134). Provincial authorities in Patagonia also
sought to attract foreign investments. Meetings were held between the governor
of Rio Negro, Miguel Saiz, and different Chinese entities, who stated their inter-
est in investing in the region’s agriculture (La pelea por la tierra 2011). Reports
also suggest that these efforts enjoyed federal support, and that ministers of the
former President Nestor Kirchner participated in the delegations which trav-
elled to China to negotiate the deal (Costantino 2016, p.144). In 2010, Governor
Saiz presented an agreement with the Chinese state-owned enterprise
Heilongjiang Beidahuang. When presented, the deal had already been signed,
and its content was held secret for the public during the negotiations (GRAIN
2011, p.3). It implied the concession of some 320.000 hectares for production of
soy, wheat, and oilseed rape, destined for the Chinese market (El Sindrome de
China 2011). The initial investment of US$1.5 billion would give Beidahuang
priority to purchase production output over a 20 year period, and its outlay
would be repaid with a 5% annual interest rate. The deal was presented as dis-
tinct from a “sale” by governor Saiz, as it was based on contracts with local pro-
ducers, rather than on acquisition of public lands, and he highlighted its alleged
potential to create in the order of 100.000 jobs (Un acuerdo entre China y Río
Negro genera polémica 2011). Local authorities generally acted in a very ac-
commodative manner as a facilitator of the investment project, and appears to
have been strongly motivated by the prospects of logistics development and
land price increases (Costantino 2016, p.144).
The Rio Negro project eventually met critique from abroad range of local
stakeholders. Mobilizations against the deal grew to comprise of diverse re-
gional and national social organizations, indigenous peoples, students, scien-
tists, labour unions, and local producers and neighbors to the lands in question6
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5 Extranjerización (in
Spanish) describes a general
trend of land grabs in different
Latin American countries.
(Schilan 2012). Environmental specialists raised alarm regarding the deal’s po-
tential impact on a region with scarce water resources, and concerning the zon-
ing of native forests, which made some refer to these plans as an “ecocide”
(GRAIN 2011, p.4). The Argentinean NGO, Grupo de Reflexión Rural, also
strongly criticized the introduction of large-scale agro-industrial farming in the
region, and the concomitant dedication of local land resources to meeting food
demand abroad (Ibid p.5). As the lower Rio Negro valley constitutes the histori-
cal homeland of the indigenous Mapuche, this community and the Indigenous
Advisory Council (CAI) also became deeply engaged in the protests. The
Mapuche was not consulted prior to the agreement, which led to claims that the
constitutional statutes regarding indigenous people’s rights had been violated
(COHA 2011).
The framing of the agreement was strongly based on the notion of sover-
eignty and concerns for the national environmental and cultural heritage. These
preoccupations were reflected in the title of a campaign launched by a local
NGO, El Foro Permanente por una Vida Digna, which was dubbed, “No Soy,
No China: land and food sovereignty for Argentina”. The group strongly re-
jected the agreement, stressing that “we oppose the agro-export mega-project
instrumentalized by the national and local government, which comprises of
320.000 hectares of soil and nature of Rio Negro to be handed over to the au-
thority of the Chinese republic, which violates our sovereign laws, which insti-
tutes agriculture without farmers, which pollutes us with its pesticides, and
which harms the present and future generations” (El Sindrome de China 2011) .
The Pastoral Care Ministry of the Catholic Church also disproved of the
concession of land to contract farming, stressing how it would jeopardize the fu-
ture of the Rio Negro residents (GRAIN 2011, p.6). At a meeting in the city of
Bariloche, the local Association of Biologists, along with students from differ-
ent parts of the country issued a joint declaration of alert, denouncing the “im-
plementation of an agro-industrial and transgenic production model” highlight-
ing the risks for ‘’the native flora and fauna and for the human population’’ (Río
Negro: profesionales y estudiantes 2010). Local socio-environmental concerns
were thus married with narratives of the preservation of national sovereignty.
This served to establish a connection to storylines revolving around foreign ex-
ploitation, which prevailed in the post-neoliberal political period (Torrado
2016). By buying into nationalistic narratives, the opposition to the Rio Negro
project both gained legitimacy, but also created pressures for action from the
central political level, which had assumed a strongly sovereignty-focused dis-
course. This tactic appears to have been relatively successful, as the ruling
Kirchnerismo’s local branch, - which regionally constituted the opposition -
also became opposed to the agreement. The Minister of Agriculture, Julián
Domínguez, also expressed his skepticism in similar terms, stressing that it “ap-
peared as a complex task to live side by side with another sovereign state inside
of our own” (Un acuerdo entre China y Río Negro genera polémica 2011).
President Cristina Kirchner was also pressed by the agribusiness interests in
the Argentinean Agrarian Federation (FAA), which wanted regulation of for-
eign land acquisitions inserted within the legislative agenda. Deputy Pablo
Orsolini, from the FAA, also presented the need to limit foreign land deals with
a similar sovereignty-based emphasis, stressing that, ‘’we cannot permit that
Argentina becomes one of the only countries in the world where it is possible to
buy land in unlimited quantities with complete swiftness and impunity’’ (Afir-
man que este año podría aprobarse la ley 2011). Although the Kirchner adminis-
tration took some initial steps to regulate foreign land purchases, a significant
amount of internal uncertainty about the appropriateness of this course of action
became evident (Un acuerdo entre China y Río Negro genera polémica 2011).
Thus, while announcing the intention to device a law regulating foreign land
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purchases, Kirchner nonetheless highlighted the importance that this legislation
would be tailored so as to avoid any anti-investment bias (Afirman que este año
podría aprobarse la ley 2011). As stated by an Argentinean NGO representative,
Kirchner sought to display concern for foreign land grabbing, without having to
impose overtly restrictive regulation towards these investments, “I think that it
was a way for the Kichner administration to show its awareness about the issue,
without treating it in a more profound manner (...) the legal impediments even-
tually imposed for foreign land purchases were quiet limited”.7 Kirchner’s am-
biguity about addressing foreign land deals should be viewed in light of the
imperatives imposed by the development model pursued at the time. Thus, in
spite of the political shift towards a more left-leaning government from 2003,
the continued reliance on agricultural exports resulted in a political amalgam of
social redistribution backed by commodity revenues, expressed as a “progres-
sive neo-extractivism” (Cáceres 2015; Gudynas 2009) which often led eco-
nomic considerations override socio-environmental concerns.
On April 27, 2011, the law no.26.737, which addressed foreign land acquisi-
tion was presented by President Kirchner. The law established a 15% limit for
foreign land ownership on the national, provincial, and municipal level, and
mandated that no more than 30% of lands in these entities could be owned by
any single nationality. It also defined a ceiling of 1000 hectares for land owner-
ship by foreign individuals or economic groups (Ley 26.737). The law has been
criticized for not referring to environmental protections, or the rights of workers
or the indigenous population, and for lacking a clear definition of foreign own-
ership (COHA 2011). Reports that foreign land investments continued through
Argentinean investor societies also came to the public’s attention in the follow-
ing years (Vazquez & Sili 2017, p.134). Facing prospects of continued transna-
tional capital inflows into Argentinean agriculture, voices from the indigenous
movement called for tighter regulation, that also would address the commodifi-
cation of land (Las barreras a la extranjerización 2013). As the law no.26.737
did not have any retrospective effect, it did not affect the Rio Negro project. Yet,
a ruling from the court in Rio Negro in November 2011 suspended the project
on environmental grounds until adequate preventive and precautionary mea-
sures could be taken, which eventually led to its definitive cancellation. The rul-
ing was hailed by groups opposed to foreign land investments as a historical
precedent for Argentina and all of Latin America, and as an important measure
in defense of national food sovereignty (La justicia frena inversión de China en
Río Negro, 2011).
IV.3 The “peaceful Chinese purchase” of land in Santa Cruz
During the 20th century, agricultural expansion in Bolivia has been driven
by both internal migration and foreign land acquisition. The two-tracked agri-
cultural development model pursued since the 1940s meant that migrants from
the Bolivian highlands received plots of 20-50 hectares for cultivation of do-
mestic food supplies in the lowlands, while capital-strong investors received
large tracts between 500-50.000 hectares for export-oriented farming (McKay
& Colque 2016, p.583). From the 1980s, efforts to pursue agro-industrial devel-
opment were intensified through the Programa de Desarrollo de las Tierras
Bajas del Este, comprising mechanization and productive specialization in
grains and oilseeds (Urioste 2008, p.185). As part of this development, foreign
agribusiness made incursions into the Bolivian lowlands, particularly the Santa
Cruz province. Brazilian producers became strongly integrated within the Bo-
livian soybean complex, and from the early 1990s towards the harvest season of
2006-2007, they appropriated some 40% of the total area dedicated to soy pro-
duction (Urioste 2012, p.447). Foreign land investments have thus become
widespread in the Cruzeño soy sector (Bolivia: Más de un millón de hectáreas
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en manos de extranjeros 2011), and large-scale deals reaching 100.000-200.000
hectares from Argentina, Japan, and Middle Eastern countries have also materi-
alized (COHA 2011).
For most of the 20th century, the Bolivian regulatory environment for for-
eign land acquisitions was extremely permissive. Yet, the agrarian laws
no.1715 of 1996 and no.3545 of 2006, which subsequently were inscribed in ar-
ticle 396 of the Bolivian Constitution of 2009, explicitly prohibited the sale of
land to foreigners by the state (Constitution Bolivia 2009; Ley no.1715:1996;
Ley no.3545:2006). Land deals between private parties, though, could continue
unhindered. Although a popular referendum had resulted in the constitutio-
nalization of a 5000 hectare ceiling for foreign land ownership, agribusiness
pressures led to a provision which permitted an unrestricted number of associa-
tions to each hold 5000 hectares, which essentially invalidated the land ceiling
(McKay & Colque 2016). Furthermore, lack of public oversight meant that until
2010, large cultivated areas were unregistered (Bolivia: Más de un millón de
hectáreas en manos de extranjeros 2011).
In the 2000s, this legal milieu provided a fertile context for land acquisition
by foreign investors. In 2005, the Chinese Shanghai Pengxin Group purchased
12.500 hectares in the Santa Cruz province which were dedicated to soy, sor-
ghum, and maize production, at the price of US$27 million (GRAIN, 2016).
The Pengxin Group engages in a great variety of activities, and apart from agri-
culture, its sub-branches span from infrastructure, to textile production and re-
search (A partir del interconectado se plantea una etapa de desarrollo 2010).
Although the Pengxin Group often has been associated with the Chinese gov-
ernment’s ‘’going out’’ policy, the decision to invest in Bolivia has likely been
made independently by the company (Jie & Myers 2016, p.106). This is conver-
gent with a trend of increasingly market-based investment by Chinese private,
state-owned, and provincial companies in the 2000s (Myers 2013). In contrast
to other major land deals involving Chinese actors in South America, the
Pengxin agreement did not incite significant negative reactions8. Although the
Bolivian NGO Fundación Tierra publicly contested the deal as violating the
constitutional ceiling of 5000 hectares, the issue did not gain salience within the
public sphere9. Strong reactions, which did otherwise usually accompany ex-
tractive investments in oil, natural gas, and infrastructure projects in Bolivia did
thereby not result from the deal with the Chinese Pengxin Group, which to some
extent, went relatively unnoticed10. This warrants analysis of the domestic
sources of potential contestation, which in the other cases of land deals exam-
ined reacted differently to Chinese land purchases.
Positioned at the margins of agro-industrial transformations, smallholders
reactions become particularly relevant to analyze, because a latent potential for
contestation oftentimes can be found within these segments. Yet, the particular
configuration of capital within the rural productive organization in Santa Cruz
nonetheless seems to have discouraged smallholder protest against the advance
of agribusiness. Due to lack of capital, small farmers have been unable to en-
gage in soy production, which has made them rent their land to larger soy pro-
ducers. As petty bourgeoisie rentiers, many do not identify with the landless
peasant movement, and have therefore not wanted to challenge the development
of the soy complex, in spite of their essential exclusion from the productive ac-
tivities within this. (McKay & Colque 2016) Thus, the Cruceño smallholders’
“adverse incorporation in the soy complex has impeded overt forms of resis-
tance” (McKay 2017a).
Considering the cases from Brazil and Argentina, domestic agribusiness
could be considered as another potential source of contestation of the Chinese
incursions into Bolivian agriculture. Yet, the presence of international investors
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has nevertheless been well received by Cruceño elites. As foreign agribusiness
brings capital and access to knowhow and new market opportunities, dominant
classes have not sought to obstruct its entry (Urioste 2012, p.453). Local cattle
ranchers, which hold a large proportion of uncultivated areas, have benefitted
from selling or renting their land to foreign investors (Urioste 2012, p.452). The
same openness to foreign investment appears to characterize Bolivian soy pro-
ducers, who have encouraged this as an important source of input provision and
technical modernization (McKay 2018). Cooperative relations thereby appear
to characterize the manner that land-holding classes in Santa Cruz have engaged
with foreign agricultural investors, as is highlighted by an interviewee from a
Bolivian NGO “In general the agribusiness and landholding elites are very posi-
tively minded towards the capital flows towards the agricultural sector in Santa
Cruz. The landholders are strongly opposed to every law that might restrict the
purchases of land on behalf of foreigners.”11.
Finally, the Bolivian state does not appear particularly skeptical towards
agro-industrialization, nor very proactive in limiting this development. Thus,
despite a discursive distancing from the Latifundio and agribusiness, the state
has often facilitated foreign land acquisitions (Bolivia: Más de un millón de
hectáreas en manos de extranjeros 2011). An NGO representative even de-
scribes foreign land purchases as a “taboo”, oftentimes avoided within public
discourses12. The Morales government has furthermore been active in promot-
ing the proliferation of an agro-industrial rural development model, with exten-
sive plans aiming towards the annual expansion of the agricultural frontier of
around 1 million hectares (McKay 2017a). The state has furthermore been criti-
cized for adopting a rather permissive stance towards illegal land transfers
(Sugieren leyes que prohíban venta de tierras 2011). This becomes reflected by
the fact, that there have been no serious attempts at clearly registering foreign
land acquisitions within public records13. Official rhetoric, revolving around
narratives of “agrarian revolution” or “food sovereignty”, has thus increasingly
diverged from the effectively pursued policies of “reconstituated neo-liberal-
ism”, which lead to marginal changes but no structural transformation of the
economy (McKay & Colque 2016, p.588). This also includes either the co-
option of social movements, or the introduction of severe punishment for land
occupations, which constitute peasant movements’ main instrument of resis-
tance (McKay & Colque 2016 pp.605-606).
Despite the absence of major protests in the Santa Cruz province, some
voices on the national level did speak in favor of tighter regulation of foreign
land acquisitions. In 2011, former land minister Alejandro Almaraz stressed the
need to restrict land sales to foreigners, and to keep clearer records of land hold-
ings (Sugieren leyes que prohíban venta de tierras 2011), - an objective that was
backed by different social movements (Encuentro Plurinacional en su etapa
definitoria 2012). Eventually, in December 2013, the law no.477 “against land
subjection and trafficking” was passed. Yet, rather than introducing any signifi-
cant new measures to limit foreign land acquisitions, the law established stricter
punishments, ranging between 3-8 years of prison for illegal appropriation and
sale of public lands, which already was enshrined in the Bolivian Constitution.
The law also banned official recognition of foreign owned land which did not
serve an economic social purpose (Ley no. 477:2013). Law no. 477 appears
most significant in terms of regulating existing foreign rural land possessions in
Bolivia, while still keeping a window open for international investment. The
harsh punishments which it contained may indeed have served the interest of
land holders14, as they also applied to land occupations conducted by peasant
movements. So, in contrast to cases in Argentina and Brazil, the law did not ma-
terialize due to fears of increased Chinese land acquisition, neither did it signifi-
cantly halt foreign land deals. After the law was passed, the Confederation of
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Rural Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB) and the Confederation of Intercultural
Communities of Bolivia (CCIB) continued to push for restrictions of foreign
land purchases. Gustavo Aliaga from the CCIB thus underscored that regula-
tions still favored foreigners more than Bolivian producers, while Rodolfo
Machaca from the CSUTCB claimed that Brazilian, Chinese, and Russian land
grabbers continued unhindered (Piden que el Gobierno elimine la extran-
jerización de tierras 2014).
V. Conclusions and Discussion of Chinese land deals in South America
The processes through which domestic groups reacted to attempted Chinese
land grabs in the three South American countries analyzed are marked by some
distinctive features as well as common traits. Their outcomes nonetheless vary,
as the Chinese land deal in Bolivia did not meet significant opposition, and nei-
ther did it contribute to regulatory changes. In both Brazil and Argentina, the
forces opposing these agreements were relatively heterogeneous. The resis-
tance movement to the Rio Negro project assumed a networked (Rocheleau
2015) structure, comprising of a diverse array of civil society actors. Although
opposition to foreign land deals in both Argentina and Brazil comprised of cer-
tain agribusiness branches and different social movements, these forces appear
to have mobilized in separate tracks, due to widely differing motivations. Agri-
business’ support for legal restrictions to foreign land investments became very
significant in spurring regulatory change in Brazil; possibly more so than in Ar-
gentina, where protests by local social movements gained a strong momentum.
In similarity with Baird (2014), in both Argentina and Brazil, a national sover-
eignty-focused discourse was selectively appropriated by agribusiness elites in
their efforts to negatively frame these attempts. The lack of incentives by the
Cruceño elites, and the absence of viable means and immediate reasons for
smallholder segments to oppose the Pengxin Group’s land purchase in Santa
Cruz seems to have become evident. In line with the logic of the most similar
case design, the different composition of agribusiness capital and variations in
the socioeconomic structure in this region thereby appears to constitute a central
explanatory factor in accounting for the non-materialization of protest in the
Bolivia case.
Resistance to Chinese land deals was expressed through different avenues.
The ‘’official politics’’ mode of protest (Kerkvliet 2009), referring to a cooper-
ative approach in relation to authorities, appears to have characterized domestic
agribusiness engagement in Brazil and Argentina. A more conflictive engage-
ment through “advocacy politics” has constituted the preferred mode of protest
in the Argentinean social mobilizations. The manner in which the Chinese land
deals were framed in public debate appears to have been a central factor in de-
fining the subsequent legislative responses. In Brazil, the negative framing re-
volving around a “takeover”, - with references to Chinese land grabs in Africa, -
emanated mainly from parts of the rural elite and groups within the political and
economic intelligentsia, and attracted much attention within national media.
The strong grassroots linkages of the Rio Negro campaign in Argentina meant
that a discursive amalgam was produced, as local socio-environmental concerns
were coupled with nationalistic sovereignty-focused narratives. In Bolivia, a
significant dissonance between official discourse revolving around self-deter-
mination of local peoples, and effectuated policy, meant that the legislation in-
troduced in 2013 fell short of restricting foreign land deals, and even might have
strengthened agribusiness vís-a-vís smallholder segments.
The magnitude of the manifestations against the Chinese deals may appear
remarkable, considering their relatively modest extent compared to investments
from other countries. The backlashes which they generated, and the accusations
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of “neo-colonial behavior”, even appear to have dampened Chinese interest in
land investments (Myers 2013; Myers & Jie 2015, p.8). The strong global atten-
tion surrounding the internationalization of Chinese enterprises, and the cloud
of uncertainty with respect to its potential scale and implications, might well
have spurred fears within the Brazilian and Argentinean agricultural sectors,
which were not awoken in relation to larger land deals with developed country
companies. While the Bolivian deal was signed by the private Pengxin Group,
the acquisitions in Brazil and Argentina were sought effectuated by state-owned
enterprises. This may also have nurtured existing speculations and worries
about any potential secondary motivations with these agreements. The question
of whether Chinese investments are driven by official strategies and non-market
related geopolitical concerns (Chi 2010, p.108; Albuquerque & Lima 2016,
p.579; Wang et al., 2013) also appears to have been central to the debates about
how to meet this development. The fact that the attempted deals in Brazil and
Argentina were Chinese thereby appears to have left a window of opportunity
for both elites and social groups that already were skeptical or directly opposed
towards foreign land purchases, to gain some voice at the political level, which
resulted in a certain measure of regulatory action.
The different domestic responses to Chinese land deals should also be
viewed in light of the structural position of each country within the global politi-
cal economy of agriculture. The status of Argentina and Brazil as New Agricul-
tural Countries (NACs) (Friedmann 1992) can be viewed as an intermediate po-
sition, whereby both receive large amounts of investments, but still retain a
noticeable concentration of domestic capital within certain agricultural sub-
sectors, and in specific links within the agro-food chains. While in Brazil, there
is a strong foreign presence within the agro-industrial complex (Albano & De
Sá 2011, pp.63-64; Schlesinger 2008, p.9), direct cultivation is mainly domi-
nated by domestic producers (Hopewell 2013, p.608). Chinese expansion into
direct production has thereby likely generated fears of rising land prices
amongst Brazilian farmers (Oliveira 2018), which explains the worries ex-
pressed by some Brazilian agricultural producers. This converges with Thaler’s
(2014, p.832) observation that middle-income semi-peripheral countries, with
capital-intensive agricultural sectors, are more likely to reject large-scale land
deals than poorer countries, with less capital and a larger need for external reve-
nue generation. The present conclusions thereby strongly highlight rural pro-
duction structures and their international connectedness as the principal explan-
atory point of departure for understanding the varying reactions to Chinese land
purchases. Although the Chinese presence within the agricultural sector is more
open to negative framings than are other investments, motivations to either op-
pose or consent to these agreements should be found within existing rural divi-
sions, and the historically defined latent conflict potential of contentious land is-
sues.
The different ways in which the Brazilian, Argentinean, and Bolivian states
have mediated the pressures for and against Chinese land grabs also reflect a di-
vision between an attentiveness to certain social and sectorial concerns, and a
clear interest in commodity-related investments. The systemic imperatives
pushing the state towards facilitating natural resource based development con-
stitutes an element of continuity between the neo-liberal period of the 1990s,
and the post-liberal period of the 2000s and early 2010s (Vazquez & Sili 2017,
p.120). The structural power of agribusiness therefore means that regulation of
this sector is associated with high political costs. The support from swaths of
Argentinean and Brazilian agribusiness has thereby been decisive in order to
permit the regulatory measures taken within this area. It thus becomes difficult
to identify the laws passed to restrict foreign land grabs as part of a more funda-
mental Polaniyan double movement (Cotula 2013) towards social regulation of
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land markets. The legal measures taken in a context of strong attention towards
Chinese land grabbing thereby appear more as a momentary impulse, than as a
more fundamental step to address rural inequalities.
Niels Søendergaard (NielsS@insper.edu.br) has a PhD in International Relations from the International Relations Institute of
the University of Brasília and is currently researcher at the Insper Agro Global.
References
Andrieu, J. & Costantino, A. (2017) La tierra como acervo de bienes comunes. Los conflictos sociales sobre bienes comunes
ligados a la extranjerización de la tierra en la Argentina reciente. Eutopia, s/v(11), pp.77-94.
Albano, G.P. & De Sá, A.J. (2011) Globalizacão da Agricultura: Multinacionais no Campo Brasileiro. Revista de Geografia
(UFPE), 28(1), pp.54-80.
Aldrich, S., Walker, R., Simmons, C., Caldas, M. & Perz, S. (2012) Contentious Land Change in the Amazon’s Arc of
Deforestation. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 102(1), pp.103-128.
Albuquerque, J.A.G. & Lima, L.A.F. (2016) Chinese Investment in Brazil: Can It Match the Relevance of Bilateral Trade?
Asian Perspective, 40(4), pp.579-601. DOI: 10.1353/apr.2016.0026
Anseeuw, W. & Taylor M. (2014) Factors shaping the global land rush. In: A. Reid Ross (ed). Grabbing back: essays against
the global land grab. Oakland: AK Press, pp.45-60.
Baird, I.G. (2014) The Global Land Grab Meta-Narrative, Asian Money Laundering and Elite Capture: Reconsidering the
Cambodian Context. Geopolitics, 19(2), pp.431-453. DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2013.811645
Borras Jr., S.M., & Franco, J. (2010) Towards a broader view of the politics of global land grab: rethinking land issues,
reframing resistance. Initiatives in Critical Agrarian Studies Working Paper Series. Available through:
<http://ramshorn.ca/sites/ramshorn.ca/files/Borras &Franco,PoliticsofLand Grab.pdf>
Brent, Z.W., Alonso-Fradejas, A., Colque, G. & Sauer, S. (2018) The “tenure guidelines” as a tool for democratising land and
resource control in Latin America. Third World Quarterly, 39(7), pp.1367-1385. DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2017.1399058
Cáceres, D.M. (2015) Accumulation by Dispossession and Socio-Environmental Conflicts Caused by the Expansion of
Agribusiness in Argentina. Journal of Agrarian Change, 15(1), pp.116-147. DOI: 10.1111/joac.12057
Castro, L.F.P., Hershaw, E. & Sauer, S. (2017) Estrangeirização e internacionalização de terras no Brasil: oportunidades para
quem? EstudosInternacionais, 5(2), pp.74-102. DOI: 10.5752/P.2317-773X.2017v5n2p74
Castro, L.F.P. & Igreja, R.L. (2017) Estrangeirização de Terras na Perspectiva das Pormas de Colonialidade no Agro
Latino-Americano. Revista de estudos e pesquisa sobre as Américas, 11(2), pp.164-179.
Chi, L. (2010) Opportunity for Economic Expansion. In: L. Chi (ed). China After the Subprime Crisis. Houndmills: Pelgrave
Mcmillan, pp. 106-122.
Costantino, A. (2016) El capital extranjero y el acaparamiento de tierras: conflictos sociales y acumulación por desposesión en
Argentina. Foreign Capital and Land Grabbing: Social Conflicts and Accumulation by Dispossession in Argentina.,
55(1), pp.137-149. DOI: 10.7440/res55.2016.09
Cotula, L. (2013) The New Enclosures? Polanyi, international investment law and the global land rush. Third World Quarterly,
34(9), p.1605-1629. DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2013.843847Y
Edelman, M. (2013) Messy hectares: Questions about the epistemology of land grabbing data. Journal of Peasant Studies,
40(3), pp.485-501. DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2013.801340
Edelman, M., Oya,C. & Borras, S.M., 2013. Global Land Grabs: Historical processes, theoretical and methodological
implications and current trajectories. Third World Quarterly, 34(9), p.1517-1531. DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2013.850190
Flexor,G. & Leite, S.P. (2017) Land market and land grabbing in Brazil during the commodity boom of the 2000s. Contexto
Internacional, 39(2), pp. 393-420. DOI: 10.1590/s0102-8529.2017390200010
Friedmann, H. (1992) Distance and durability: Shaky foundations of the world food economy. Third World Quarterly, 13(2),
pp.371-383. DOI: 10.1080/01436599208420282
George, A. & Bennett, A. (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Gudynas, E. (2009) Diez tesis urgentes sobre el nuevo extractivismo: contextos y demandas bajo el progresismosudamericano
actual. In: A. Schuldt, A. Acosta, A. Barandiarán, A. Bebington & M. Folchi, (eds). Extractivismo política y sociedad.
Quito: CAAP/CLAES, pp.187-225.
Hall, R., Edelman, M., Borras, S.M., Scoones, I., White, B. & Wolford,W. (2015) Resistance, acquiescence or incorporation?
An introduction to land grabbing and political reactions “from below.” Journal of Peasant Studies, 42(3-4), pp.467-488.
DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2015.1036746
Hopewell, K. (2013) New Protagonists in Global Economic Governance: Brazilian Agribusiness at the WTO. New Political
Economy, 18(4), pp. 603-623. DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2013.736957
Jie, G. & Myers, M. (2016) Chinese agricultural investment in Latin America. Less there than meets the eye? In: M. Myers & C.
Wise (eds). The political economy of China-Latin American relations in the new millennium: Brave new world. New
York: Routledge, pp. 143-196.
Kerkvliet, B.J.T. (2009) Everyday politics in peasant societies (and ours). Journal of Peasant Studies, 36(1), pp.227-243. DOI:
10.1080/03066150902820487
16/20 Revista de Sociologia e Política v. 28, n. 74
Mamonova, N., 2015. Resistance or adaptation? Ukrainian peasants’ responses to large-scale land acquisitions. Journal of
Peasant Studies, 42(3-4), pp.607-634. DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2014.993320
McAllister, K.E. (2015) Rubber, rights and resistance: the evolution of local struggles against a Chinese rubber concession in
Northern Laos. Journal of Peasant Studies, 42(3-4), pp.817-837. DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2015.1036418
McKay, B. (2017) The politics of convergence in Bolivia: social movements and the state. Third World Quarterly, 39(7),
pp.1247-1269. DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2017.1399056
McKay, B. (2018) Control grabbing and value-chain agriculture: BRICS, MICs and Bolivia’s soy complex. Globalizations,
15(1) pp.74-91. DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2017.1374563
McKay, B. & Colque, G. (2016) Bolivia’s soy complex: the development of “productive exclusion.” Journal of Peasant
Studies, 43(2), pp.583-610. DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2015.1053875
Moreda, T. (2015) Listening to their silence? The political reaction of affected communities to large-scale land acquisitions:
insights from Ethiopia. Journal of Peasant Studies, 42(3-4), pp.517-539. DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2014.993621
Myers, M. (2013) China’s Agricultural Engagement in Latin America. The Inter-American Dialogue [online]. Available
through: https://chinaandlatinamerica.com/2013/11/19/chinas-agricultural-engagement-in-latin-america-2/. Accessed
at: 25.mar.2018.
Myers, M. & Jie, G. (2015) Chinas Agricultural Investment in Latin America: A critical assessment. China and Latin America
Report. The Dialogue. [online]. Available from:
http://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Chinas-Agricultural-Investment-in-Latin-America.pdf
Nakatani, P., Faleiros, R.N., Vargas, N.C., Felipe, P.C.N., Gomes, H. & Trindade, R.V. (2014) A Expansão Internacional da
China através da Compra de Terras no Mundo. Textos e Contextos, 13(1), pp.58-73. DOI:
10.15448/1677-9509.2014.1.15489
Oliveira, G.L.T. (2016) Regularização fundiária e a “corrida mundial por terras” no Brasil. Câmpo-Território: Revista de
Geografía Agrária, 11(23), pp.43-75. DOI: 10.14393/RCT112302
Oliveira, G.L.T. (2017) The South-South Question: Transforming Brazil-China Agroindustrial Partnerships. PhD
Dissertation. Berkeley: University of Berkeley.
Oliveira, G.L.T. (2018) Chinese land grabs in Brazil? Sinophobia and foreign investments in Brazilian soybean agribusiness.
Globalizations, 15(1), pp.114-133. DOI: 10.1080/14747731.2017.1377374.
Pereira, C. & de Castro Neves, J.A. (2011) Brazil and China: South-South Partnership or North-South Competition? Foreign
Policy at Brookings. Policy Paper 26 [online]. Available through:
https://www.brookings.edu/research/brazil-and-china-south-south-partnership-or-north-south-competition/%5Cnpaper
s3://publication/uuid/85C6D2B9-112E-41E3-B0C2-DC52DBD042AA
Pitta, F.T., Boechat, C.A. & Mendonça, L.M. (2017) A produção do espaço na região do MATOPIBA: violência,
transnacionais imobiliárias agrícolas e capital fictício. Estudos Internacionais, 5(2), pp.155-179. DOI:
10.5752/P.2317-773X.2017v5n2p155
Powell, E.D. (2012) Las relaciones económicas entre China y Brasil: ¿muy grandes para fracasar? Apuntes:Revista de ciência
sociales, 38(71), pp.189-215. DOI: 10.21678/apuntes.71.665
Rocheleau, D.E. (2015) Networked, rooted and territorial: green grabbing and resistance in Chiapas. Journal of Peasant
Studies, 42(3-4), p.695-723. DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2014.993622
Sauer, S. (2010) Demanda mundial por terras: “land grabbing” ou oportunidade de negócios no Brasil? Revista de Estudos e
Pesquisas sobre as Américas, 4(1), pp.72-88.
Sauer, S. & Borras, S.J. (2016) `Land Grabbing’ e `Green Grabbing’: Uma leitura da `corrida na produção acadêmica’ sobre a
apropriação global de terras. Câmpo-Território: Revista de Geografía Agrária, 11(23), pp.6-42. DOI:
10.14393/RCT112301
Sauer, S. & Leite, S.P. (2012) Expansão agrícola, preços e apropriação de terra por estrangeiros no Brasil. Revista de Economia
e Sociologia Rural, 50(3), pp.503-524. DOI: 10.1590/S0103-20032012000300007
Schilan, R. (2012) Colonias del Siglo XXI: alimentos, especulación y arrebato territorial. Geografía Humana General 2012,
textos unidad 4, pp.1-5.
Schlesinger, S. (2008) Soja: el grano que sigue creciendo. Grupo de Trabajo sobre Desarrollo y Medio Ambiente en las
Américas. Trabajo de Discusión No.21, pp.1-23. Available through:
<https://docplayer.es/13161823-Grupo-de-trabajo-sobre-desarrollo-y-medio-ambiente-en-las-americas.html>.
Accessed at: 02 mar. 2018.
Schneider, A. (2011) What shall we do without our land? Land Grabs and Resistance in Rural Cambodia. International
Conference on Global Land Grabbing. Sussex. Available through:
<https://landmatrix.org/media/uploads/alison_schneider.pdf> Accessed at: 02 mar. 2018.
Scoones, I., Hall, R., Borras, S.M., White, B. & Wolford, W. (2013) The politics of evidence: Methodologies for understanding
the global land rush. Journal of Peasant Studies, 40(3), pp. 469-483. DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2013.801341
Simmons, C.S. (2005) Territorializing land conflict: Space, place, and contentious politics in the Brazilian Amazon.
GeoJournal, 64(4), pp.307-331. DOI: 10.1007/s10708-005-5809-x
Smalley, R., & Corbera, E. (2012) Large-scale land deals from the inside out: Findings from Kenya’s Tana Delta. Journal of
Peasant Studies, 39(3-4), pp.1039-1075. DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2012.686491
Temper, L. (2018) From boomerangs to minefields and catapults: dynamics of trans-local resistance to land-grabs. Journal of
Peasant Studies, 46(1), pp.118-216. DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2017.1398144
Repercussions of Chinese land deals in South America 17/20
Thaler, G. (2014) The Twenty-First Century Agricultural Land Rush. In: R.J. Herring (ed). The Oxford Handbook of Food,
Politics, and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195397772.013.017
Torrado, M. (2016) Food Regime Analysis in a Post-Neoliberal Era: Argentina and the Expansion of Transgenic Soybeans.
Journal of Agrarian Change, 16(4), pp.693-701. DOI: 10.1111/joac.12158
Urioste, M. (2008) Evolución y características del sector soyero en Bolivia. In: X. Soruco, W. Plata, and G. Medeiros (eds). Los
barones del oriente. Santa Cruz: Fundación Tierra, pp.173-240.
Urioste, M. (2012) Concentration and “foreignisation” of land in Bolivia. Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue
canadienne d’études du développement, 33(4), pp.439-457. DOI: 10.1080/02255189.2012.743878
Vazquez, A. & Sili, M. (2017) Dinámica espacial del proceso de extranjerización de latierra en la Patagonia. Journal of Latin
American Geography, 16(2), pp.117-137. DOI: 10.1353/lag.2017.0024
Wells-Dang, A. (2010) Political space in Vietnam: a view from the riceroots. The Pacific Review, 23(1), pp. 93-112. DOI:
10.1080/09512740903398355
Wang, Y., Faria, M.D., Carvalho, J.L.F. (2013) Investimento Externo direto Chinês no Brasil: Motivações Desafios e
Perspectivas. Internext: Revista Eletrônica de Negócios Internacionais, 8(2), pp.1-21.
White, B., Borras, S.M., Hall, R., Scoones, I. & Wolford,W. (2012) The new enclosures: Critical perspectives on corporate land
deals. Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(3-4), p.619-647. DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2012.691879
Wilkinson, J. & Wesz Jr., V.J. (2013) Underlying issues in the emergence of China and Brazil as major global players in the
new South-South trade and investment axis. International Journal of Technology Management & Sustainable
Development, 12(3), pp.245-260. DOI: 10.1386/tmsd.12.3.245_1
World Bank (2011) Rising Global Interest in Farmland. Agriculture and Rural Development Series. Washington D.C.: The
World Bank.
Newspaper and Blog Articles
A partir del interconectado se plantea una etapa de desarrollo (2010) TiempoSur [online]. 21.dec. Santa Cruz. Available
through: <https://www.tiemposur.com.ar/nota/19702-a-partir-del-interconectado-se-plantea-una-etapa-de-desarrollo-.html>.
Accessed at: 17 mar. 2018.
Chinas interest in Farmland makes Brazil Uneasy (2011) New York Times [online]. New York, 26.Apr. Available through:
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/27/world/americas/27brazil.html>. Accessed at: 10 mar. 2018.
Sugieren leyes que prohíban venta de tierras agrícolas a extranjeros (2011) Bolivia Rural [online]. 21.dec. Available through:
<http://www.boliviarural.org/noticias/2011/1250-sugieren-leyes-que-prohiban-venta-de-tierras-agricolas-a-extranjeros.html>.
Accessed at:18 mar. 2018.
Bolivia: Más de un millón de hectáreas en manos de extranjeros (2011) Bolpress [online]. 28.mar. Available through:
<https://www.bolpress.com/?Cod=2011032817>. Accessed at: 17 mar. 2018.
COHA, Council of Hemispheric Affairs (2011) A Land-Grabber’s Loophole [online]. 8.aug. Available through:
<http://www.coha.org/a-land-grabbers-loophole/>. Accessed at: 15 mar. 2018.
China compra terras no Brasil (2010) O Estado de São Paulo [online]. São Paulo, 3.Aug. Available through:
<http://opiniao.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,china-compra-terras-no-brasil-imp-,589697>. Accessed at: 10 mar. 2018.
GRAIN (2008) Seized! The 2008 land grab for food and financial security. Grain Briefing October 2008. Barcelona.
GRAIN (2011) New Agricultural agreement in Argentina: a land grabbers “instruction manual”. Against the Grain. 25.jan.
GRAIN (2016) The Global Farmland Grab in 2016: how big how bad? Grain. Against the Grain. Barcelona. Available through:
<https://www.grain.org/article/entries/5492-the-global-farmland-grab-in-2016-how-big-how-bad>. Accessed at: 10
mar. 2018.
Un acuerdo entre China y Río Negro genera polémica (2011) La Nación [online]. 28.aug. Available through:
<https://www.lanacion.com.ar/1401319-un-acuerdo-entre-china-y-rio-negro-genera-polemica>. Accessed at: 16 mar.
2018.
Plano de Voo": CNA quer chineses nas terras do Brasil (2012) Diário de Indústria Comércio e Serviços [online]. 28.nov.
Available from: <https://www.dci.com.br/opiniao/plano-de-voo/plano-de-voo-cna-quer-chineses-nas-terras-do-brasil-1.428571>.
Accessed at: 28 nov. 2018.
La pelea por la tierra: Una empresa estatal de China quiere comprar 200 mil hectáreas (2011) La política online [online].
11.mar. Available through: <http://www.lapoliticaonline.com/nota/50726/>. Accessed at: 15 mar. 2018.
Afirman que este año podría aprobarse la ley que restringe la venta de tierras a extranjeros (2011) La Política Online [online].
3.mar. Available through: <http://www.lapoliticaonline.com/nota/nota-71682/>. Accessed at: 16 mar. 2018.
La justicia frena inversión de China en Río Negro (2011) La Política Online [online]. 23.nov. Available through:
<http://www.lapoliticaonline.com/nota/57168/>. Accessed at: 17 mar. 2018.
El Sindrome de China: la crescente presencia china en América Latina (2011) farmlandgrab.org [online]. 17.apr. Available
through: <https://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/view/18478>. Accessed at: 25 mar. 2018.
Estrangeiros já têm US$ 60 bilhões em terra no Brasil (2013) UOL Notícias [online]. 20.jan. Available through:
<https://colunaesplanada.blogosfera.uol.com.br/2013/01/20/estrangeiros-ja-tem-us-60-bilhoes-em-terras-no-brasil/>.
Accessed at: 25 mar. 2013.
18/20 Revista de Sociologia e Política v. 28, n. 74
Brazil mulls leasing farmland to foreigners (2011) Reuters [online]. 9.may. Available through:
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-land/brazil-mulls-leasing-farmland-to-foreigners-idUSTRE74856K20110509>.
Accessed at: 25 mar. 2011.
Estrangeiros compram 22 campos de futebol por hora (2010) Folha de São Paulo [online]. São Paulo, 02.nov. Available
through: <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/poder/po0211201002.htm>. Accessed at: 09 mar. 2018.
Río Negro: profesionales y estudiantes de Biología rechazan la producción de soja en la provincia (2010) Puertae - Colectivo
de noticias [online]. 28.out. Available through:
<http://puertae.blogspot.com.br/2010/10/rio-negro-profesionales-y-estudiantes.html>. Accessed at: 15 mar. 2018.
Las barreras a la extranjerización de la tierra tienen sus agujeros (2013) El País [online]. 18.apr. Available through:
<http://blogs.elpais.com/eco-americano/2013/04/las-barreras-a-la-extranjerizaci%C3%B3n-de-la-tierra-tienen-sus-agujeros.html >
. Accessed at: 15 mar. 2018.
Food scarce sparks Third World land rush (2009) Reuters [online] 29.apr. Available through:
<https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-agriculture-landgrab/food-scare-sparks-third-world-land-rush-idUKTRE53S97420090430>.
Accessed at:19 mar. 2018.
Encuentro Plurinacional en su etapa definitoria (2012) El Día [online]. 9.jan. Available through:
<https://www.eldia.com.bo/mobile.php?cat=150&pla=7&id_articulo=82610>. Accessed at: 25 mar. 2018.
Um milhão de hectares já são de estrangeiros, diz Glauber Silveira (2010) Olhardireito [online]. 18.Abr. Available through:
<http://www.olhardireto.com.br/noticias/exibir.asp?id=103280>. Accessed at: 20 mar. 2018.
CNA quer investimentos chineses no agronegócio brasileiro (2012) Terra [online]. 27.nov. Available from:
<https://www.terra.com.br/economia/cna-quer-investimentos-chineses-no-agronegocio-brasileiro,1e18b781eab41410
VgnCLD200000bbcceb0aRCRD.html>. Accessed at: 15 mar. 2018.
Piden que el Gobierno elimine la extranjerización de tierras (2014) Página Siete [online]. 3.mar. Available through:
<http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2014/3/4/piden-gobierno-elimine-extranjerizacion-tierras-15393.html>. Accessed
at: 17 mar. 2018.
Other Sources
AEI - American Enterprise Institute (2018) China Global investment Tracker. Available through:
<http://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/>. Accessed at: 03 may. 2018.
Câmara dos Deputados (2011a). Trabalhadores e ruralistas divergem sobre investimento estrangeiro [online]. 25.jul.
Available through:
<http://www2.camara.leg.br/camaranoticias/noticias/AGROPECUARIA/200265-TRABALHADORES-E-RURALIST
AS-DIVERGEM-SOBRE-INVESTIMENTO-ESTRANGEIRO.html:. Accessed at: 14 mar. 2018.
Câmara dos Deputados (2011b) Restrição à compra de terras por estrangeiros é prioridade de comissão [online]. 25.jul.
Available through:
<http://www2.camara.leg.br/camaranoticias/noticias/AGROPECUARIA/200262-RESTRICAO-A-COMPRA-DE-TE
RRAS-POR-ESTRANGEIROS-E-PRIORIDADE-DE-COMISSAO.html>. Acessed: 14 mar. 2018.
Constitution Bolivia (2009) Constitución Política del Estado, 7/2.
BRAZIL Lei 5.709 (1971) Presidência da República Casa Civil. Subchefia para Assuntos Jurídicos, Brazil.
Ley 26.737. Régimen de Protección al Dominio Nacional sobre la Propiedad, Posesión o Tenencia de las Tierras Rurales. 22.
dec. 2011. Republica Argentina.
Ley 1715. Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria. Congresso Nacional de Bolívia, 18/10/1996.
Ley 3545.Reconducción de la Reforma Agraria. Congresso Nacional de Bolivia. 28/11/2006.
Ley 477. Ley contra el avasallamiento y tráfico de tierras. La Assemblea Legislativa Plurinacional. Bolivia. 30/12/2013.
Glossary of Acronyms
ABIN - Brazilian Intelligence Agency
ABIOVE - Brazilian Vegetable Oil Industry Association
AGU - Attorney General of the Union
APROSOJA - Brazilian Association of Soy Producers
CAI - Indigenous Advisory Council
CCIB - Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia
CNA - National Confederation of Agriculture
CONTAG - National Confederation of Agricultural Workers
CSUTCB - Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia
Repercussions of Chinese land deals in South America 19/20
FAA - Argentinean Agrarian Federation
INCRA - National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform
NACs - New Agricultural Countries
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization
Repercussões de acordos de compras de terra chineses na América do Sul: vetores de mobilização e
instituições domésticas
RESUMO Introdução: O artigo analisa as reações domésticas aos acordos de compras de terras chinesas no Brasil, Argentina e Bolívia
e como essas tentativas afetaram a estrutura regulatória desses países para aquisições de terras estrangeiras. Materiais e métodos: As
mobilizações contra esses acordos são examinadas com foco em sua composição interna de forças sociais e nas estruturas que elas
produzem para pressionar por restrições regulatórias. Resultados: O surgimento de protestos na Argentina e no Brasil, relativo à falta
de oposição na Bolívia, é explicado através de um desenho de caso mais semelhante, enfatizando as diferenças na estrutura
socioeconômica rural e composição de capital no setor agrícola como fatores explicativos centrais, respondendo pela variação do
resultado nos casos examinados. Discussão: Com ponto de partida no debate sobre o investimento global em terras, o artigo contribui
para entender como o investimento estrangeiro é acomodado em diferentes modos de desenvolvimento dependente de commodities.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Governança da terra; América do Sul; Conflitos pela terra; China; Agronegócio.
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